Introduction
Global remittance flows to developing countries have experienced accelerated growth since the early 1990s, increasing from less than $50 billion around 1990 to a whopping $328 billion in 2008 (Ratha et al, 2009 ). Statistics by country indicate India, China, and Mexico as the largest recipients of money from migrants abroad. In contrast, Tajikistan, Tonga and Moldova, and other small states lead in terms of the share of remittances in GDP. Among factors considered to have triggered this rapid growth are the increase in international migration, the cost reductions as well as convenience of transferring money through formal channels, and the better measurement and reporting of remittances in the Balance of Payments statistics.
The evolution of remittances flows prompted researchers to evaluate their role as an external foreign exchange inflow and their ability to neutralize macroeconomic shocks and reduce output volatility. We add to this literature by examining the remittances' (REM's) stability, cyclicality and stabilizing impact, in comparison to the same three features of two other external inflows, namely foreign direct investment (FDI), and official development aid (ODA). Our methodology relies on coefficients of variation to assess the stability and stabilizing impact, whereas cyclicality is evaluated using correlations between GDP on the one hand and the original measures as well as the cyclical components of REM, FDI and ODA on the other.
The analysis covers 116 countries over the period and reveals that ODA is more stable than REM in 73% of the countries examined and REM more stable than FDI in 72% of them.
The coefficients of variation (CV) for 1980-2007 averaged over the sample countries confirm that ODA is the most stable (CV = .47), followed by REM (.75) and FDI (1.47). In terms of cyclicality, the results indicate that REM is pro-cyclical, FDI more pro-cyclical, and ODA counter-cyclical. Finally, ODA has a stabilizing impact in 56% of the countries examined, while REM and FDI are destabilizing or have no effect in most of the countries (around 80% and 90%, respectively).
Our strategy of comparing the behavior of remittances and other capital flows has been previously employed by other studies in the literature (Ratha, 2003 , IMF 2005 , Lueth and RuizArranz, 2007 . The motivation for this approach relates to the fact that, as explained in Frankel (2009) , capital flows are in theory expected to deliver the benefits of smoothing, diversification, financing high-return investment opportunities, and disciplining policies. However, they have been shown to typically fail at fulfilling these expectations. It is, thus important to check the extent to which alternative sources of foreign exchange such as remittances and ODA are, in contrast to private flows, more reliable macroeconomic tool in the hands of policymakers. We aim to improve on previous comparisons of these capital inflows by providing a description of their behavior according to additional measures to those used in prior studies.
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we conduct the analysis at the country-level, for a large number of countries and a wide time-frame. This is because some of the conventional wisdom on the stability of remittances both absolute and relative to ODA and FDI is based on aggregate (global) data even though policymakers are typically concerned with the behavior of these flows at their own country level. Furthermore, most empirical work focusing on the macroeconomic impact of remittances typically constrains the estimated effects to be the same for all countries in the sample.
1 Second, we treat stability, cyclicality and stabilizing impact separately, while most previous literature has typically equated counter-cyclicality with stabilizing impact. As elaborated in Section 2.3 and shown in Section 4, the former measure implies the latter one for most countries, but not necessarily for all. Although some studies have examined the stabilizing impact distinctly from counter-cyclicality, by estimating the impact of remittances on the variability of GDP (or GDP growth), 2 they tended to do so by imposing an identical relationship between these variables for all countries. In contrast, our methodology allows us to identify the behavior of the various foreign capital inflows separately for each country.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews prior literature, Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 presents the empirical results and Section 5 concludes.
Selected Literature Review
Section 2.1 describes studies that examine the behavior of stability of remittances and other external inflows. Section 2.2 reviews research that uses statistical methods to analyze cyclicality of remittances in relation to output volatility. Finally, Section 2.3 discusses how the issue of stabilization has been approached hitherto in the literature.
1 One exception is Chami et al. (2005) , who run regressions at country level. 2 IMF (2005), Acosta et al (2008) 2.1. Stability Ratha (2003) was the first to point out the recent remarkable ascending path of global remittances compared to the evolution of other sources of external financing, namely foreign direct investment (FDI), capital non-FDI flows and official development aid (ODA). Moreover, the study found remittances to be more stable than ODA and FDI and much more so than the procyclical non-FDI capital inflows. This latter finding was confirmed by subsequent research including Buch and Kuckulenz (2004) and IMF (2005) .
While previous analyses of stability typically focused on global external inflows, our paper examines the issue at the country-specific level, relying on as many individual countries as we could find data for.
Cyclicality
The claims of large size and relative stability of remittances flows elicited the interest of researchers and policy makers alike who became interested in examining remittances' potential to reduce output volatility and absorb macroeconomic shocks. To that goal, many studies attempted to determine the behavior of remittances in relation to macroeconomic indicators, more particularly whether the former move counter-or pro-cyclically with the latter.
The discussion about cyclicality found a theoretical justification in the literature studying the determinants of remittances. There are several theories explaining why migrants remit. The first gives prevalence to family ties, considered to favor the sending of remittances through various channels, of which an important one is the altruistic motive. The altruistic motive of remitting hypothesizes that migrants help relatives and friends back home out of care considerations, without envisioning a pecuniary or alternative material interest. In other words, the welfare of distant relatives and friends is a component of migrants' own utility function (Rapoport and Docquier, 2006, Niimi et al, 2008) . Under this assumption, remittances are expected to behave counter-cyclically, with migrants remitting more during times of economic hardship in the origin countries. The second, more recent theory holds that migrants optimize placement of their savings between origin and destination countries. Hence, remitting money is a form of investment. This theory is broadly called "the portfolio" approach and its prediction is that remittances display a On the other hand, Lueth & Ruiz-Arranz (2006) obtain that for the eleven countries in their analysis remittances do not seem to increase in the wake of natural disasters. In the same line, Ratha (2003) mentions that remittance receipts declined in Turkey and the Philippines after the financial crises that hit the countries in the late 1990s, although the decline was less than that of other capital inflows. This evidence prompted Ratha (2003) to assert that the response of remittances to dramatic changes in economic activity was unclear.
As for the empirical literature examining the cyclicality direction of remittances in relation to macroeconomic indicators, the conclusions are mixed. In support to the counter-cyclical response, Mishra (2005) finds for 13 Caribbean countries that a 1 percent decrease in real GDP leads to a 3 percent increase in remittances two years later. Similarly, Bouhga-Hagbe (2004) shows that remittances to Morocco are, over the long run, negatively correlated with real GDP in Morocco.
El Sakka and McNabb (1999) find that remittances to Egypt increase with country's inflation. In a panel specification including 113 countries and up to 29 years, Chami et al. (2005) obtain that remittances to GDP are negatively correlated with the GDP growth.
Examining the determinants of remittances using a panel of 101 countries during 1970 -2003 , IMF (2005 finds a significant negative impact of home country output on remittances. Nevertheless, the study's analysis of the correlations between aggregate remittances and other inflows on the one hand, and GDP on the other indicates that remittances are positively correlated with GDP, although they are not as sharply procyclical as the non-FDI capital inflows. Acosta et al (2008) examine the correlation between the cyclical components of remittances and real output in recipient countries for 26 Latin American countries and find evidence of countercyclicality even after controlling for the endogeneity of output fluctuations. Extension of the analysis to other developing countries leads to the same result, but also reveals great heterogeneity by country group in the sensitivity of remittances to oscillations in the real output.
The aggregated de-trended remittances sent to the 12 countries examined in Sayan (2006) are also negatively correlated with de-trended GDP. Nevertheless, both Acosta et al (2008) and Sayan (2006) find that the correlations at country-specific level weaken the verdict of counter-cyclicality obtained from the aggregate level analyses. Thus, several countries in the samples of each study exhibit pro-rather than counter-cyclical remittances in relation to output. This result prompts Sayan (2006) to conclude that "counter-cyclicality is hard to generalize to all countries."
Representing the literature which gives preference to the "portfolio" approach in remitting, Lueth Finally, Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2005) show that remittances are more pro-cyclical in countries with shallower financial systems.
Our study finds that at the country specific level counter-cyclicality of remittances is observed less often than pro-cyclicality, suggesting that, for the majority of the large number of countries examined, the portfolio motive of remitting is stronger than the altruist one.
Stabilization
The general perception arising from the literature that evaluates the cyclicality of remittances seems to be that counter-cyclicality automatically implies the ability to buffer macroeconomic shocks. Thus, Sayan (2006) states that the "countercyclicality enables remittances to serve as a stabilizer that helps smooth out large fluctuations," while "in the case of procyclicality, remittances may act as a destabilizing force since this would increase the capacity of swings in remittance flows to produce additional fluctuations in output or current account balances, with serious macroeconomic effects." In the same line, Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2006) conclude that remittances may not play a major role in limiting vulnerability to shocks, because they are found to be aligned with the business cycle in the home country.
One skeptical voice is that of Chami et al (2005) who despite finding remittances to be countercyclical question their role as a tool for economic development, because of what they consider the moral hazard accompanying the process of remitting money. This would be caused by the asymmetric altruism leading to free riding of remittance recipient on senders' good will. In other words, recipients tend to work less when relying on money from abroad. An interesting finding, by Bugamelli and Paternò (2005) , is that remittances tend to help countries obtain access to foreign capital flows and therefore prevent them from having to implement drastic Current Account reversals. Such an impact might be more likely to be captured by econometric estimation than by our analysis.
Our study finds that remittances are not stabilizing for the majority of analyzed countries. Though the results should be of much interest to policymakers and analysts, it is clear that further work is needed and additional empirical analysis is on our research agenda. Our study also points out the necessity to consider the issues of cyclicality and stabilization separately. While the two features seem to indeed go together in most cases, the several instances when this is not true suggest that counter-cyclicality does not necessarily trigger stabilization.
We say that a capital inflow X (X = ODA, FDI or remittances R) is stabilizing (destabilizing) if the coefficient of variation of (GDP + X) is smaller (larger) than that of GDP, i.e., if
. Since , it follows that .
Thus, the fact that X is counter-cyclical, i.e., that does not ensure that or that . Whether X is actually stabilizing or not will depend on the level of both and the average value of (X/GDP), denoted here by χ. If is large and χ is small, X might be counter-cyclical and destabilizing at the same time.
A possible though less likely scenario is for X to be pro-cyclical as well as stabilizing. In this case, , and since > 0, it follows that .
Nevertheless, it is possible for X to be stabilizing, i.e., for to be smaller than (where "SD" stands for "standard deviation", and the upper bars above the denominators denote the mean values). A necessary condition for that to occur is for χ to be sufficiently large so that the ratio [GDP+X)/GDP] is larger than
. This would only likely to be the case for countries that are small and poor and thus have low GDPs
and are very open to migration and recipients of large amounts of remittances.
In summary, the cyclicality of remittances may indicate whether altruism or self-interest is the dominant motive in a particular country. It will also indicate whether remittances are stabilizing or not in most cases, though certainly not in all of them. Counter-cyclical remittances (or other sources of capital inflows) may be destabilizing, and vice versa, though the latter would seem to be less likely prevalent. As shown in Section 4.3, these types of results actually do occur for some countries.
Data
We Table A1 lists the names of the countries and the classifications by income group and by regions.
Remittance data for some individual countries are incomplete. Sixty-four of the 116 countries taken into consideration have values for 20 or more years (with an average of 910 million constant US dollars), 39 report data for 10 to 19 years, while 13 for less than 9 data points.
Remittances are available in all years for 34 countries 4 . The averages of the coefficients of variation for various aggregates are presented in Table 2 . Nigeria's CV for ODA amounts to 2.37. 
Cyclicality
If remittances are predominantly driven by altruistic motives, it can be expected that migrants send more money during periods of economic slowdown characterized by declining GDP. To investigate the counter-cyclicality of remittances vis-à-vis GDP, correlations between GDP on the one hand, and REM, ODA and FDI on the other, are calculated for each country, and -as in the previous section -at aggregate level and for geographical and income-level groups. We present results using both the original indicators (in conformity with the methodology employed in the sections about stability and stabilizing impact) and de-trended ones (which is the norm in the literature examining cyclicality). As an additional exercise, the tables also include correlations between GDP and the sum of all 3 indicators, REM+ODA+FDI. Correlations between GDP and the sum of two of the three indicators (REM+ODA, REM+FDI, ODA+FDI) are provided in Appendix Tables A2 through A5 . Table 4 In general, Table 4 reveals that with few exceptions REM has smaller positive correlations with GDP compared to FDI. In conclusion, while ODA behaves consistently counter-cyclically, REM and FDI are pro-cyclical, with FDI more so than REM. The analysis to this point reveals that of the three inflows, ODA is the most susceptible to help buffer economic crises. While it is not surprising that FDI is positively related to GDP, the finding of pro-cyclicality for REM would seem to imply that the portfolio or investment motive for remitting dominates the altruistic motive.
The share of countries with the non-de-trended indicators of interest negatively correlated with GDP is provided in Table 5 . 6 On the one hand, 54% of countries have countercyclical ODA
(between 33 and 80% in the various groups). On the other, more than 50% of them display a procyclical pattern for REM and FDI. Overall, FDI flows are pro-cyclical for a larger number of countries compared to REM and ODA. Thus, 11% of countries have negative correlations between FDI and GDP, compared to 21% for REM, and 54% for ODA. At group level, this order in magnitude is reversed only for FDI and REM in the case of East Asia and the Pacific.
Both Tables 4 and 5 indicate that REM and FDI are more pro (ODA is more counter) -cyclical in the lower and upper middle income groups than in the low income group. 7 Thus, the correlation coefficient between FDI and GDP is about 0.60 for both lower and upper middle group countries in panel a of Table 4 , while the figure for low income countries is 0.40. The same ranking, although with different magnitudes, is apparent in panel b. Likewise, as shown in Table 5 Finally, comparison of the last columns in Table 4 to Appendix Table A2, as well as of the last   column in table 5 to Appendix Table A3 , reveals that adding ODA to REM+FDI reduces the pro-cyclicality of these inflows, while adding REM to FDI+ODA and adding FDI to REM+ODA increases pro-cyclicality in most cases.
Since the majority of studies focusing on the correlation between GDP and remittances examine only the relationship between the cyclical components of the indicators, we present equivalents of Tables 4 and 5 using variables de-trended based on Hodrick-Prescott's method. The results in Tables 6 and 7 weaken, but do not invalidate the conclusions reached using the analysis of the non-detrended indicators. Thus, the coefficients of correlation presented in Table 6 are closer to zero than the ones in Table 4 , suggesting a lack of strong link for all inflows and within most groups considered. While REM and FDI are pro-cyclical in the majority of cases (the percentages of countries with counter-cyclical REM or FDI are less than 50% in Table 7 ), ODA's counter-cyclicality is much less obvious in both Table 6 , where most coefficients reported by panel b are positive, and in Table 7 , where the percentage of countries with counter-cyclical ODA, although still higher than that of REM and FDI, is most often below 50%. FDI is procyclical in still a greater number of countries than REM for most groups considered (exceptions as per Table 7 : East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia and the lower middle income countries). As a general result, ODA is counter-cyclical in 43% of all developing countries, REM in 35% of them meaning it is pro-cyclical in 65%) -while FDI is counter(pro)-cyclical in 31%(69%).
Although in a weakened version, the conclusions according to which REM and FDI are more pro (ODA is more counter)-cyclical in the lower and upper middle income groups than in the low income group hold in the analysis based on de-trended indicators as well. Likewise, adding ODA to REM+FDI (REM to FDI+ODA and FDI to REM+ODA) is found to reduce (increase) procyclicality of the flows (as shown in Tables A4/A5 ).
Stabilizing Impact
We examine now whether or not the various capital flows are stabilizing. This differs from cyclicality which looks at the relationship between annual changes in GDP and annual changes in these flows, while stabilization looks at the impact of these flows on stability over the entire period. Table 8 presents the shares of countries for which REM, FDI, ODA and REM+FDI+ODA help decrease the variability of GDP measured by the coefficient of variation. Appendix Table A6 provides the stabilizing impact of REM+FDI, REM+ODA and FDI+ODA.
The results depict ODA as the most stabilizing of the three inflows (stabilizing GDP in 56% of the countries), followed by REM (20%) and FDI (11%). The situation is similar for the various groups examined. With respect to the "marginal" stabilizing impact, we observe that adding ODA to REM+FDI increases the stabilizing impact of these inflows, i.e. ODA+REM+FDI is more stabilizing than REM+FDI, while adding REM to FDI+ODA and adding FDI to REM+ODA decreases it. In fact, ODA+REM+FDI is stabilizing in close to twice as many countries as REM+FDI (30% vs. 19%). Interestingly, the stabilizing impact of both REM and ODA decreases with income (ranging from 25% and 61% for the low income countries to 11% and 43% for the upper middle income ones).
Together with the findings in Tables 5 and 7 , it appears that ODA is both counter-cyclical and stabilizing, REM is mostly pro-cyclical and destabilizing, while FDI is more pro-cyclical and more destabilizing than REM.
Note that it is possible for the CV(X+GDP) to be larger (smaller) than CV(GDP) even if the correlation coefficient between X and GDP is < (>) 0 (X=REM, ODA or FDI). 8 This is illustrated by the group of lower middle income countries, where pro-cyclicality of REM is more widespread than that of FDI (73% of countries for REM as opposed to 69% for FDI as shown by Table 7 ), although REM is more stabilizing than FDI (22% of the countries for REM as opposed to 7% for FDI in Table 8 ). As another example, ODA is counter-cyclical in one third of the lowincome group countries, but stabilizing in 61% of these countries (i.e. in 85% more countries).
This dramatic difference suggests the presence of a substantial number of countries where greater counter-cyclicality for ODA is not related to a stabilizing impact of ODA. Furthermore, of the 92 countries that have pro-cyclical REM (with cyclicality being assessed based on original indicators), a stabilizing effect is still present in 9 of them (or 10%). Additionally, the analysis of the de-trended variables indicates no stabilizing effect in 11 of the 41 countries that have a counter-cyclical REM.
The stabilizing or destabilizing impact of the various capital inflows may depend not only on their stochastic behavior, but also on their share in GDP. 9 Examining the 37 countries with share of remittances in GDP higher than the mean value of 5.75 % (Table 1) , we find REM and GDP to be positively correlated in 29 countries. Of these, REM is destabilizing in 19, has no impact in 6, and is stabilizing in 4. In other words, REM is not destabilizing in one third of the countries where REM is pro-cyclical. Based on the de-trended variables, the results indicate that among the 10 countries with counter-cyclical REM, for 5 there is stabilization, for 2 -no effect, and for 3 -a de-stabilizing impact. Thus, based on de-trended variables, REM is only stabilizing in 50% of the countries where it is counter-cyclical.
Our results about the stabilizing impact of remittances come at odds with the negative and significant coefficient of remittances found by IMF (2005) in the regression explaining output volatility. However, the volatility definition used in that study consists of the standard deviation of output growth, while we define it as the coefficient of variation over the period examined.
Moreover, the IMF study measures remittances using the remittances/GDP ratio, hence the finding of a negative impact might be due to the fact that this ratio would be negatively correlated with GDP even in the case where remittances were constant and possibly even if remittances were pro-cyclical. On the other hand, we use for each individual country the actual level of remittances rather than its ratio to GDP.
Conclusions
That remittances are a stable and growing source of foreign exchange and are more stable than foreign direct investment (FDI) and official development aid (ODA) flows seems to have become the received wisdom. To check this and other findings in the previous literature, this study investigated the stability, cyclicality and stabilizing impact of remittances, FDI and ODA. Both at the country and aggregate levels, it was found that REM is less stable than ODA, but more stable than FDI. Second, while ODA is counter-cyclical in 54% of the countries (43% according to analysis based on de-trended indicators), remittances and FDI are pro-cyclical in between 80%
and 90% of the countries examined (65% and 69% if variables are de-trended). Similarly, ODA is stabilizing in a majority of countries, while REM is destabilizing or has no effect in more than three-quarters of the countries and FDI in close to 90% of the countries. In addition, the stability of ODA (FDI) decreases (increases) with countries' income, REM and FDI are more pro (ODA is more counter)-cyclical in the lower and upper middle income groups than in the low income group, and the stabilizing impact of REM (ODA) increases (falls) with countries' income.
Finally, adding ODA to REM+FDI (REM to FDI+ODA, and FDI to REM+ODA) reduces (raises) the pro-cyclicality and raises (reduces) the stabilizing impact of these flows.
Though, as documented in a large part of the literature, remittances increase at times of major upheavals such as natural disasters, armed conflicts or economic crises in migrants' source countries, we find them to be pro-cyclical as well as destabilizing for a majority of developing countries over large periods of times (1980 to 2007 in our analysis). Moreover, adding REM to FDI and ODA inflows raises the pro-cyclicality of these inflows as well as their destabilizing impact. Our results at this stage convey a cautiousness message, suggesting that the stabilizing virtues of remittances inflows be examined on a country-by-country basis. Explaining the patterns in the observed behavior of remittances and other inflows requires further empirical examination.
The objective of this paper was to simply provide evidence on the behavior of remittances, as well as ODA and FDI. The examination of the motives underlying it, its determinants or its impact is on our research agenda.
It could be argued that there might be a problem with our conclusions being drawn solely based on the examination of formal remittance flows, while informal channels are estimated by the researchers to still attract about 50% of remittances (Ratha, 2006) . However, all studies dealing with remittances only use official remittance data because of the lack of data on informal remittances. Consequently, the cyclical behavior of informal remittances cannot be ascertained, and neither is it possible to know the impact of including informal remittances on our findings.
This lack of data obviously plagues the findings of all remittance studies.
As a final comment, whether REM flows are pro-or counter-cyclical and stabilizing or not, their impact might also depend on their importance relative to GDP and other sources of inflows.
However, even though REM may be small as a share of GDP, it may amount to a large share of the income of recipient households and may therefore have a substantial impact on the stability of these households' income. This issue will also be studied in future work. 
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